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United States v. Crocker Na-

tional Corp., 656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981).
The election of individual directors with diverse business experiences to any board of directors may be viewed as a method of bringing
ideas and new management into a corporation and should be encouraged. In those situations where an individual sits on the boards of two
companies which compete or do business with each other, however,
problems develop. A director has a duty to serve the corporation on
whose board he sits to the best of his ability.' When that individual
serves two competing corporations in the capacity of director, his duty
of loyalty to one company may conflict with his duty to the other. The
existence of interlocking directorates between competing firms provides opportunities for exchanges of information, foreclosure of rivals,
and the coordination of policies between the firms to an extent that
might adversely affect or completely eliminate competition between
them. 2 Interlocking directorates may be either horizontal (linking
two or more competitors) or vertical (linking two or more companies
3
that are or can be in a buyer-seller relationship).
In United States v. Crocker National Corp., 4 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether horizontal interlocking
directorates between competing banks and insurance companies violated the competing corporations clauses of section 8 of the Clayton
I V.

P. AREEDA & D. TumRNE, ANTITRUST LAW 11300 (1980).

See id; Travers, Interlocks in CorporateManagement and the Antitrust Laws, 46 TEx. L.
REv. 819, 840 (1968).

3 V. P. AREEDA & D. TuRNsa, supra note 1, at 11300.
4 656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981).
3 Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), contains five paragraphs. The
first three (hereinafter referred to as banking paragraphs) relate to interlocks between bank
personnel and are relevant in this Note only to the extent that they aid in explaining the fourth
paragraph. The fourth paragraph (hereinafter referred to as competing corporations paragraph)
reads as follows:
No person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more corporations, any
one of which has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than
$1,000,000, engaged in whole or in part in commerce, other than banks, banking
associations, trust companies, and common carrierssubject to the Act to regulate
commerce, approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, if such
corporations are or shall have been theretofore, by virtue of their business and
location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the provisions of any of
the antitrust laws. The eligibility of a director under the foregoing provision shall be
determined by the aggregate amount of the capital, surplus, and undivided profits,
exclusive of dividends declared but not paid to stockholders, at the end of the fiscal
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Antitrust Act 6 (Clayton Act).7 The Crocker action commenced when
the United States filed two complaints in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of California alleging that the interlocking directorates held by five individuals in three banks and four

insurance companies violated the Clayton Act. 8 Although the defendants stipulated that they competed in the business of extending
mortgage and real estate loans, the complaints neither contained
allegations of any anti-competitive acts, nor specified any particular
anticompetitive consequences flowing from the interlocks. In granting

the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the district court held
that section 8 of the Clayton Act did not prohibit bank/insurance
company interlocks9 or bank holding company/insurance company
interlocks.' 0 The court further held that the limited antitrust exemption afforded to insurance companies by the McCarran-Ferguson
Act" did not vitiate the defendants' duty of compliance with section 8
12
of the Clayton Act.
year of said corporation next preceding the election of directors, and when a director
has been elected in accordance with the provisions of this Act it shall be lawful for
him to continue as such for one year thereafter.
Id. § 19 (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
7 656 F.2d at 449.
United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 422 F. Supp. 686, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 656
F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981). The complaint in Crocker alleged that three individuals served
simultaneously as directors of Crocker National Bank and either Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, The Equitable Life Assurance Society of America, or the Mutual Life Insurance
Company of New York. It further alleged that the same individuals also served as directors of
Crocker National Corporation, the parent of Crocker National Bank, while serving as directors
of one of the above named insurance companies.
The second complaint alleged that two individuals served simultaneously as directors on
either Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association or Bankers Trust Company, and on
Prudential Insurance Company of America. The complaint further alleged that these individuals
also served simultaneously as directors of one of the bank holding companies, either Bank
America Corporation or Bankers Trust New York Corporation. Id.
9 656 F.2d at 702-03.
IL Id. at 705.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976). The McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the business of
insurance from compliance with federal antitrust laws to the extent that it is regulated by state
law specifically. Section 1012(b) provides:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to
the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2,
1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as
amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as
the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business
of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.
Id. § 1012(b).
12 United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 422 F. Supp. 686, 706 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 656
F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:568

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit upheld the trial court's view that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
does not exempt interlocks between banks and insurance companies
from compliance with the Antitrust statutes. 3 The court reversed the
district court on the primary issue in dispute, however, by deciding
that section 8 prohibits an individual from simultaneous service as a
director for a competing bank and insurance company when any
4
agreement between them potentially violates federal antitrust laws. 1
The court held that section 8 of the Clayton Act must be interpreted as
barring the challenged interlocks since the purpose of the Act was to
strengthen the general federal prohibition against anticompetitive
practices which the Sherman Antitrust Act' (Sherman Act) first codified. 6 The court of appeals similarly found interlocks between bank
holding companies and insurance companies to be in violation of
section 8 of the Clayton Act.' 7 The court reached this result despite
the fact that the bank holding companies only competed with the
insurance corporations through their subsidiaries; the holding companies' complete control of their subsidiaries "8' would render any other
result meaningless. ' 9
The cornerstone of the court's opinion is an accurate reading of
the exclusionary clause exempting banks, trust companies, and common carriers from the strictures of the competing corporations paragraph. 20 The district court held that the language of the competing
corporations paragraph clearly excludes interlocking directorates from
compliance with section 8 if only one of the two linked corporations is
a bank. 2' The court of appeals, after an examination of the language
of the statute, found that it would be just as reasonable to limit the
exclusion to interlocks between banks. 22 In its examination of the
language of section 8, the court of appeals recognized that antitrust
laws are to be interpreted liberally and that exemptions from compli-

13 656 F.2d at 452.
1, Id. at 449.
Is 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
16 659 F.2d at 449.
17 Id. at 450-51.
18 Ui ,. td States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 422 F. Supp. 686, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1976), revd. 6.56

F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981). The district court had established that each of the banks were whollyowned subsidiaries of their parent bank holding companies. The bank holding companies
admitted control of their subsidiary banks through stock ownership and election of their subsidiaries' directors. Id.
19 656 F.2d at 450-451.
20 See note 5 supra.

21 United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 422 F. Supp. 686, 690 (N.D. Cal. 1976). rcv'd. 656

F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981).
2 656 F.2d at 434-35.
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ance are to be strictly construed.2 3 The court noted that the first
three paragraphs of section 8 prohibit interlocks between banks with
specific exceptions. 24 Therefore, reasoned the court, a "normal reading" of the entire section leads to the conclusion that only interlocks
between two or more banks are excluded from coverage by the competing corporations paragraph.25 Such a reading, the court continued, would result in an exemption of banks from coverage by the
competing corporations paragraph "only to the extent necessary to
permit the provision regarding interlocks between banks in the bank26
ing paragraphs to be fully effective."
The court interpreted the reference to common carriers in the
exclusionary clause as completely removing them from coverage by
the competing corporations paragraph. 27 Nevertheless, the court did
not find any legislative intent to indicate that the references to banks
should likewise be interpreted as completely excluding them from
coverage under the competing corporations paragraph.2 8 Chief Judge
Browning, writing for the majority, decided that to completely exclude banks from coverage by the competing corporations paragraph
would be unnecessary 2 9 and would create a loophole through which
bank/non-bank interlocks could avoid compliance with the antitrust
laws. 30 The judges opined that such a holding would blatantly nullify
the policy that exceptions to the antitrust laws are to be strictly
construed. 3' Applying that policy to the facts at hand, the court
concluded that the competing corporations paragraph must be liberally interpreted to bar the questioned interlocks. Moreover, the judges
ruled that the antitrust laws similarly mandate a strict interpretation
of the exclusionary clause, which would exempt only interlocks be32
tween two banks.

3 Id. at 440-41. See also Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, 425 U.S. 1,
11-12 (1976); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963).
.2656 F.2d at 431, 434.
' id. at 441; see note 5 supra.
21 656 F.2d at 442.
.2Id. at 442-43. The court noted that the reference to common carriers was included in the

bill as it was reported from the House Judiciary Committee, while the reference to banks came in
the final stages of the legislative process in an attempt to prevent inconsistent regulation of
horizontal interlocks between banks. Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 442.
3 Id. at 440. Such an exclusion would result in interlocks betveen competing banks being
regulated under the banking paragraphs, and interlocks between competing corporations being
covered by the competing corporations paragraph, but interlocks between competing banks and
non-banks would not be reached. Id.
31 See note 23 .spraand accompanying text.
12 656 F.2d at 441.
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The court of appeals recognized that statutes are to be "'construed in accordance with [their] underlying purpose,' " 33 and that in
the absence of an unmistakeable directive, a court may not interpret a

statute in a manner contrary "'to the broad goals which Congress
intended it to effectuate." 34 The court therefore examined the events
leading to passage of the statute in an attempt to determine whether
its interpretation of the competing corporations paragraph furthered
the intended goals of Congress in enacting the Clayton Act. 35
In the years preceding the enactment of the Clayton Act, various
political leaders expressed reservations about the ability of the Sherman Act to accomplish its broad goals.36 President Wilson encouraged Congress to enact supplemental legislation to strengthen the
Sherman Act by barring practices which threatened free competition.
Included among these practices were interlocking directorates, which
the President denounced as having the effect of concentrating control
of wealth in the hands of a few and discouraging young businessmen
37
who believed they were precluded from rising to success.

The bill introduced in response to the President's mandate was
sponsored by Representative Clayton and contained a section dealing
with interlocking directorates.3 8 The court noted that the bill as

13 Id. at 435 (quoting TRW, Inc. v. FTC, 647 F.2d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 1981)).
3iId. at 440 (quoting FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 349 (1968)).
35 Id. at 434-45. The court relied on the Supreme Court's instruction that in any case which
revolves around the meaning of a statute, the starting point in the court's analysis must be the
language of the statute itself. Croup Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,
210 (1979). It is only when the statutory language is ambiguous that resort to the legislative
history is permitted. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
11 656 F.2d at 435. The purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act was to preserve free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade. Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
4 (1957).
31656 F.2d at 436. In his message to Congress on January 20, 1914, President Wilson
denounced interlocking directorates and encouraged Congress to prohibit them. See H.R. REP.
No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1914) (part 1), reprinted in E. KINTER, LEGISLATIVE HisroRY
OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 1098 (1978). The preservation of
competition through the prohibition of specific anticompetitive practices, including interlocking
directorates, was mentioned in the platform of the Democratic Party in 1912. Travers, supra
note 2, at 824-25.
"s The section was numbered section 8 in the bill introduced by Representative Clayton on
April 14, 1914. See H. R. Rep. No. 15657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin E. KINTER, supra
note 37, at 1080. The bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary after its introduction.
The section on interlocking directorates was renumbered as section 9 by the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), reprintedin E. KINTEa, supra note 37, at 1175-76. The
section number was again changed to the original section 8 by the Conference Comm. See
Report of the Conference Comm. H.R. REP. No. 1168, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), reprintedin
E. KINTER, supra note 37, at 2466. The section regarding interlocking directorates is referred to
as section 8 throughout this Note.
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introduced did not exclude any class of corporations from coverage by
the competing corporations paragraph. 39 While an exclusion for
common carriers was inserted in the bill reported by the House Judici-

ary Committee, the Committee emphasized that in drafting this provision they had not compromised the President's intent to prohibit
40
interlocking directorates.
The court found that the Senate's treatment of the bill evidenced
concurrence with the House's conclusion that the Clayton Act's purpose was to strengthen the Sherman Act through the prohibition of

anticompetitive practices, such as interlocking directorates. 41 The
42
court noted that banks were not added to the exclusionary clause
until the bill emerged from the Conference Committee. 43

Chief

Judge Browning held that despite the Committee's failure to provide
an explanation for this addition, there was nothing in the debates
leading to the approval of the bill to indicate "any retreat by Congress
from the view that interlocking directorates between large competing
corporations were contrary to the public interest and should be condemned." 44 The court noted that the question of the applicability of
the competing corporations paragraph was never fully addressed by
Congress. In fact, the court could only discover three instances during
the debates leading to the passage of the Clayton Act when the

provision was mentioned. 45

a' 656 F.2d at 436-37.
Id. at 437. The Committee felt the legislation dealing with interlocking directorates was of
I'
critical importance. They stated that "'the concentration of wealth, money, and property in the
United States under the control and in the hands of a few individuals or great corporations has
grown to such an enormous extent that unless checked it will ultimately threaten the perpetuity
of our institutions." H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914), reprinted in E. KINTEt,
supra note 37, at 1099.
", 656 F.2d at 438-39. While the Senate made substantial changes in section 8, those changes
were confined to the paragraphs covering common carriers and horizontal interlocks between
banks. The provisions relating to interlocking directorates between competing corporations were
left substantively unchanged by the Senate. Id.
" See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
13 A Conference Committee was appointed because the House of Representatives did not
agree with the changes made by the Senate. 656 F.2d at 439.
44

Id.

15 Id. at 444-46. The first instance was a statement made by Representative Cullop during
debate to the effect that the competing corporations paragraph does not concern banks. The
court reasoned that because the sole topic under debate was horizontal interlocks between banks,
and not the extent of the reach of the competing corporations paragraph, the statement could not
be relied upon to determine the meaning of the competing corporations paragraph.
The court similarly dismissed a statement by Representative Carlin to the effect that banks
are to be regulated differently than corporations. The matter being discussed was whether an
exception created to allow small banks to escape from the provisions of the banking paragraphs
would also be applied to allow small corporations to escape regulation by the competing
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The Ninth Circuit pointed out that subsequent legislation designed to clarify the applicability of section 8 to bank/non-bank interlocks had been introduced to Congress at various times but was never
adopted. 46 The judges cautioned, however, against interpreting the

failure to adopt such legislation as an indication that Congress did not
want such interlocks to be prohibited. 47 Chief Judge Browning stated
that the actions of subsequent Congresses must not be relied upon
when attempting to ascertain the objectives underlying earlier legisla48
tion.
Analysis of the legislative history and structure of the Clayton Act
led the court to conclude that the purposes of the Act would be
furthered if interlocks between competing banks and non-banks were
prohibited by section 8. 49 The court reasoned that a holding which
would allow bank/non-bank interlocks to escape coverage by section 8
would be contrary to Congress' desire to preserve competition. 50 Since
section 8 clearly does not allow two banks or two competing nonbanks to share directors, the court could find no logical reason to
permit interlocks between banks and competing non-banks. 5'
The court cited with approval In re PerpetualFederalSavings &
Loan Ass'n, 52 a proceeding brought before the Federal Trade Commission 5 3 to determine whether a savings and loan association violated
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 54 by having on its
board of directors individuals who served simultaneously as directors
of competing commercial banks. 55 Perpetual contended that the
corporations clause. The court refused to interpret a statement made in debate concerning
banking exceptions in a manner that would defeat Congress' purpose of prohibiting interlocking
directorates.
The third incident concerned a point of order raised by Representative Mann during debate
on the Conference Committee report shortly before the Clayton Act was passed. Mr. Mann
feared that the amendments by the Conference Committee exempted interlocks between banks
and competing non-banks and opposed this result. Relying on the directive by the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964) (in interpreting statute, views of its
opponents should not be relied upon), the court disregarded the fears expressed by Representative Mann. 656 F.2d at 444-46.
46

656 F.2d at 446.

I at 446-57.
id.
48 Id. at 447; see United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963);
United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962).
49 656 F.2d at 447.

50 Id. at 440.
5, Id. at 440-41.
52 90 F.T.C. 608, vacated on other grounds, 94 F.T.C. 401 (1979).
5' The Federal Trade Commission may bring suit under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act to suppress conduct which violates the policy of the Sherman or Clayton Acts.
90 F.T.C. at 652.
- 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
" 90 F.T.C. at 648.
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challenged interlocks were not prohibited by section 8 of the Clayton
Act and pointed to the exclusionary clause as evidence of Congress'
desire to permit such interlocks. 5" In rejecting this contention, the
Federal Trade Commission found no "indication that Congress carefully considered interlocks between banks and competing non-banks,
and made a conscious decision to immunize such arrangements while
generally condemning other horizontal interlocks."'5 7 Thus, the
Commission found that since the interlocks violated section 8 of the
Clayton Act, they could also be suppressed under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 58
The court next considered whether the competing corporations
paragraph prohibited interlocking directorates between insurance
companies and bank holding companies when competition exists only
between the insurance companies and the subsidiaries of the bank
holding companies. 59 Chief Judge Browning held that the resolution
of this question depends on whether the subsidiary bank's business can
be attributed to its parent. This factor is established by the amount of
control the parent exercises over the subsidiary.6 0 The court held that
section 8 bars interlocking directorates between bank holding companies who completely control their banking subsidiaries and nonbanking corporations with whom their subsidiaries compete. 6' Since
the bank holding companies in Crocker completely controlled their
bank subsidiaries, 62 the interlocks between them and the insurance
companies were prohibited by section 8 of the Clayton Act.
Finally, the court considered whether the questioned interlocks
would be excluded from section 8 coverage by virtue of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provides an exemption from the antitrust
laws for the business of insurance that is already regulated by state
law. 3 The Crocker court found that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
was not intended to completely exempt insurance companies from
compliance with the antitrust laws, but was meant to ensure that

Id. at 655-56.
Id. at 656 (emphasis in original).
• See note 53 supra.
'6
6.56 F.2d at 450. The insurance companies and bank holding companies did not directly
compete with each other. The competition existed solely between the insurance companies and
the banking subsidiaries and involved the extension of mortgage and real estate loans. Id.
"
1

"Id.

Id. at 450-51. The court also relied upon a determination by the Federal Reserve Board
I'
that in a situation where a bank holding company's principal activity is the control of its bank
subsidiary, the bank and the bank holding company should be treated as a single entity for
purposes of section 8 of the Clayton Act. 12 C.F.R. § 218.114 (1976).
6.-See note 18 .supraand accompanying text.
1 See note 11 supra.
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regulation and taxation of the business of insurance would remain
under state control . 4 The judges concluded that the McCarranFerguson Act would not exempt the challenged interlocks from coverage by section 8 for two reasons. 65 Since there were no existing state
laws regulating interlocking directorates between insurance companies and the banks with which they compete, application of the Clayton Act would not interfere with state regulation of insurance and the
court correctly held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption was
unavailable to the defendants. 66 The court then noted that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was intended to extend limited antitrust immunity to the insurance industry. 67 Accordingly, the judges decided that
to apply the exemption here would extend it to banks which are
outside the insurance industry, thereby violating the canon of strict
construction of antitrust exemptions. 68
The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Group Life &
Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,69 wherein the Court interpreted "the business of insurance" to be the underwriting and spreading of risk, and found that this definition does not encompass all
activities of insurance companies. 70 Relying on this interpretation,
the Crocker court indicated, but did not decide, that the creation of
interlocks might not constitute the "business of insurance" and that
71
the McCarran-Ferguson exemption could, therefore, be denied.
The significance of the Crocker decision lies in the fact that it is
the first judicial expression of a definite proscription against interlocking directorates between banks and competing non-banks. As evidenced by the district court opinion and its subsequent reversal, considerable confusion existed as to the precise application of section 8 to
such interlocks.
While the circuit and district courts reached opposing conclusions, each correctly approached the issue of the applicability of section 8 to these interlocks by examining the language of the statute
itself. 72 The circuit court concluded that the language of the statute

0 656 F.2d at 452. See also Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.. 440 U.S. 205,
219 (1976); Weller, The AcCarran-FergusonAct's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587, 624, 639.
65 656 F.2d at 452-55.
88 Id. at 452-53.
67 Id. at 455.
8s id.

69440 U.S. 205 (1978).
70 Id. at 220. See also SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459 (1969).
71 656 F.2d at 455.
72

See note 24 supra.
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was ambiguous; therefore, the court resorted to the legislative history
of the Clayton Act to determine the purpose of Congress in enacting

section 8. 73 In contrast, the district court stated that the language of
the statute clearly led to the conclusion that interlocking directorates
between banks and non-bank competitors were not prohibited by
section 8.
A careful examination of relevant legislative history leads to the
inevitable conclusion that the circuit court was correct in its interpretation and application of section 8. Congress viewed the mere existence of interlocking directorates as a threat to competition and the
legislative objective in enacting section 8 was to strictly prohibit these
interlocks. Moreover, Congress was well aware of a clear method of

exempting certain interlocks from the prohibitions of section 8 as
evidenced by the first of the three banking paragraphs of the section.75
The purpose of Congress in enacting section 8 was specifically to
protect against the inherent dangers of interlocking directorates. In
view of the absence of a clear directive from Congress to immunize
bank/non-bank interlocks, the circuit court correctly held that the
bank/non-bank interlocks in question violated the Clayton Act.
By extending the coverage of section 8 to bank/non-bank interlocks, the Crocker decision effectuated section 8's procompetitive policies. This view necessitates an awareness that section 8 was designed
to be preventative in nature. 76 Unlike section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, which requires proof of conduct having an unlawful
effect, section 8 of the Clayton Act does not require that a violation of
the antitrust laws actually occur during the period of the interlock; it
is only necessary that the interlocked companies have a relationship
such that a potential agreement to eliminate competition between
them would constitute a violation of the antitrust laws.Y
The preventative nature of section 8 was emphasized in the
decision in TRW v. FTC,78 in which the court held that the section
does not require a showing that a substantial amount of competition
might be restrained. The purpose of section 8 is to prevent restraints

supra and accompanying text.
See note 21 .swpra and accompanying text.
'5 See note 5 supra.
7" See TRW, Inc. v. FTC, 647 F.2d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Penn Cent. See. Litig. v.
Pennsylvania Co., 367 F. Supp. 1158, 1168 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
" In re Penn Cent. See. Litig. v. Pennsylvania Co., 367 F. Supp. 1158, 1168 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
71 647 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1981).
" See note 24
14
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on competition before they materialize and such a purpose cannot79be
implemented if proof of a high degree of competition is required.
The broad application of section 8 in Crocker is not unprecedented. Section 8 has been interpreted to prohibit corporations from
electing, and individuals from serving, as directors where an interlock
between competitors would result.8 0 Thus, while the competing corporations paragraph states that "no person at the same time shall be a
director,""' corporations, as well as individuals, may be prosecuted
under the section. The rationale for this proposition is that section 8
cannot be effectively enforced unless corporations are prohibited from
creating interlocks which violate section 8. A corporation having no
fear of sanctions may create an interlock "and, if detected, simply
replace the ousted director with another interlocking board mem82
ber."
It is important to note that defendants accused of unlawful interlocks often claim that the interlock has been abandoned and that the
issue is moot. Traditionally, courts have viewed this allegation with
much skepticism due to their general disapproval of interlocking directorates. The mootness claim might arise in two ways. First, the
defendant corporations could cease to be competitors. The legal standard applied to such a claim is strict. 83 The corporate defendant must
demonstrate that it has both completely divested itself of all contact
with the industry in which the interlock existed, and that it lacks the
capacity to compete again in that industry in the reasonably foreseeable future.8 4 Secondly, the individual defendant may claim that he
has resigned and, thus, the illegal conduct has ceased. Mere discontinuance of the illegal conduct will not render the case moot. It is only
after the defendants demonstrate there is no reasonable expectation
that the wrong will be repeated that a finding of mootness will be
rendered. 85 Furthermore, even though the case may be mooted, the
plaintiff may proceed with a claim for injunctive relief if a real danger
of recurring section 8 violations can be established.8 Thus, the courts

11

Id. at 946-48.
80 Id. at 949; SCM Corp. v. FTC, 565 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1977).
81 15 U.S.C. § 19; see note 5 supra.
82 SCM Corp. v. FTC, 565 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1977).
83 See United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699, 709-10 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
84 V P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, at M1305.
85 See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953); TRW, 647 F.2d at 953:
SCM Corp. v. FTC, 565 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 392
F. Supp. 699, 706 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
88 See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953); TRW, 647 F.2d at 954;
SCM Corp. v. FTC, 565 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.Cleveland Trust Co., 392
F. Supp. 699, 711 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
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have demonstrated their willingness to apply section 8 not only to
bring an end to existing interlocks which violate that section, but also
to insure prevention of future violations through an award of injunctive relief.
The Crocker court's application of section 8 to the interlocks
between the bank holding companies and the insurance companies
was also expansionary. The language of section 8 only prohibits interlocks between competitors. In Crocker, the competition existed between the insurance companies and the wholly-owned and controlled
subsidiaries of the bank holding companies.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss Wright Corp.,87 refused to adopt a general rule
prohibiting interlocking directorates between two parent companies
whose only competition was through their subsidiaries; however, the
court did not preclude the application of section 8 to a parent corporation that completely controlled the policies of its subsidiary.8 8 By
finding such an interlock to be violative of section 8, the Crocker court
expanded the Kennecott holding. In so ruling, the Crocker court
indicated an awareness that Congress enacted section 8 to prohibit the
concentration of control. Consequently, the judges refused to allow
this purpose to be defeated by reading section 8 with undue literalness.89
The holding in Crocker extends the prohibitions of section 8 to
bank/non-bank interlocks, an area formerly treated as exempt from
the competing corporations paragraph. It is a fact of business life that
commercial banks today often compete with non-banks in the extension of various types of loans. Interlocks between banks and competing non-banks can have the same adverse effects on competition as
interlocking directorates between any competing corporations. 90 The
Crocker court correctly refused to interpret and apply section 8 in a
manner which would defeat the purpose of furthering competition.
The procompetitive effects of the Crocker decision are somewhat
diminished, however, when one realies that corporations can lawfully
achieve interlocks by sharing officers or employees with managerial
functions. Accordingly, while one may not serve as a director of both
a competing insurance company and a bank, the same anticompetitive result may be accomplished by serving as a director of one and a
vice president of the other. To prevent this easy avoidance of the

584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978).
IId. at 1205.

See SCM Corp. v. FTC, 565 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1977).
V P. AnEEA & D. TurNER, supra note 1, at 1302d.
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section, future courts will have to take the next logical step, namely,
to extend the ban on interlocks to officers or employees with managerial responsibilities.
As emphasized when section 8 was being considered in 1914,
"interlocking control is the vice, and it should be prevented ...
There may be interlocking control although there are no interlocking
directorates, and while it continues there will be no real competition." 9' Until Congress acts to prohibit comprehensively interlocking
control of competing corporations, decisions subsequent to Crocker
should continue to emulate the Ninth Circuit's expansionary treatment of section 8 of the Clayton Act.
Judith A. Witterschein

91 H.R. RE'. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914) (part 3), reprinted in KINTER, supra note
37, at 1157.

